3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

The Ukrainian Press

204

Beginnings of the Ukrainian Press:

I. In foreign languages:

When published	Name	Where published	Kind
1776	Gazette de Léopol	Lviv	Items of news in French
1803	Militärische Zeitschrift	Lviv	Military paper in German
1812	Kharkowskij Jezhegodnik	Kharkiv	Russian paper
1816-1819	Ukrainskij Viestnik	Kharkiv	Russian paper with Ukrainian contributions
1844	Dramatisches Unterhaltungsblatt	Eperjes	Literary paper in German
1848	Bucovina	Chernivtsi	Paper in Roumanian and German

II. In Ukrainian:

1848-1857	Zorja Halytska (Galician Star)		Daily
1850-1866	Vistnyk dla Rusyniw (News for Ukr.)	Vienna	Official publications of Austro-Hungarian authorities
1849-1858 1872-1918	Vistnyk Zakoniw (Code of laws)	Vienna	Official publications of Austro-Hungarian authorities

3: Mirchuk S-4 (no date) 1949 RDl Ukraine RDl

204

When published	Name	Where published	Kind
1849 and seq.	Vseobshchyj Dnewnyk	Lviv	Official organ for Galicia
1890-1918	Narodna Chasopys (Popular paper)	Lviv	
1850	Vistnyk (News)	Chernivtsi	Official organ for Bucovina
1850	Krajewyj Vistnyk		For the Ukrainians in Hungary

A small but influential Ukrainian press grew in the second half of the 19th century from modest beginnings which were largely official. (see preceding table). This press dealt at first only with questions of national politics and of literature, but in time grew more and more specialised. The most important newspaper at that time is the "Dilo" (Deed), a Lviv daily which, since its foundation in 1882, exercised great influence on the trend of national politics in West Ukraine, and for some time even throughout Ukraine, while the "Batjkivshchyna" (Mother-country) 1879—1896, a popular paper, which has appeared since 1897 under the name of "Svoboda" (Liberty), undertook to enlighten and influence the masses. The following are also worth mentioning: the radical papers "Narod" (The People) 1890—1895, "Hromadskyj Holos" (The Voice of the Community) since 1895, and "Zhyttja i Slovo" (Life and Word) 1894—1897 which, in the hands of journalists like M. Drahomaniv and I. Franko have done much to quicken Ukrainian life and open it to European influence.

Literary and scientific reviews, under capable editors, with national Ukrainian views, played an important part in the intellectual life of the country, developing very quickly from local publications in West Ukraine to become the main organs of public opinion throughout the country. The best of these were the "Pravda" (Truth) 1867—1898 and the "Zorja" (Star) 1880—1897 which, since 1898, has appeared under the name of "Literaturno-Naukovyj Vistnyk" (News from Literature and

204 Learning); its editors were Prof. M. Hrushevskyj, Dr. I. Franko and V. Hnatjuk, and it counted the most eminent writers in West and East Ukraine among its contributors.

After the beginnings of the East Ukraine press, "Osnova" (Intellectual Basis) 1861—1862, had been suppressed by the Imperialist Russian Government, and after all writings in Ukrainian had been forbidden by the Russian Home Minister Valujev in 1863 and by the edict of 1876, the press in West Ukraine became the voice for the entire nation. At that time the Ukrainian press consisted of 44 papers published in Austro-Hungary and in America; all political and scientific publications in Russia had to appear in Russian as the official language while Ukrainian (with official Russian spelling) might only by employed for subjects of folk-lorist or historical interest.

It was only after the Revolution of 1905 that papers could once more be published in Ukraine: on November 12th the "Khliborob" (Peasant), a national Ukrainian paper in Lubni, followed on November 24th by "Ridnyj Kraj" (Native Country), and then the most important paper in East Ukraine, the "Hromadska Dumka" (Ideas of the Community), which corresponded to the Lviv "Dilo" (Deed), which after the Revolution was replaced by the daily "Rada" (Council).

In a short time there were about 70 newspapers and journals in East Ukraine, some of which could hold their own in spite of the reaction which soon set in. At the same time the number of publications in West Ukraine was greatly increased and, before World War I, had reached the total of 80 in Austro-Hungary, 14 outside of Ukraine, 14 in USA, 10 in Canada, and 2 in Brazil.

This promising development collapsed when the First World War broke out. The government put a veto on papers in East Ukraine while Russian Military authorities suppressed those in West Ukraine. The "Dilo" and the "Ukrainske Slovo" (Ukrainian Word) and "Bucovina" (since 1885 in Chernivtsi) removed to Vienna.

The third epoch in the modern history of the Ukrainian press began with the revolution of 1917. In this year there were no

fewer than 172 Ukrainian papers and in the following year this 204
number increased to 268. The East Ukraine press disappeared with the rapid decline of Ukraine's independence and its place was taken by a communist press. In West Ukraine a struggle began with Polish and Roumanian authorities and with the censorship, with the result that many newspaper enterprises emigrated.

Official statistics give the number of Ukrainian publications in Soviet-Ukraine in 1933 as 1780 and 1494 in the middle of 1935. Among these, it is true, there are many single sheet publications to be affixed like notices or distributed and also many papers belonging to special businesses. The number of newspapers proper was 539 (23 district papers, 16 municipal and about 500 publications for the rayons). More than 80 % (465 publications) were written in Ukrainian, the remainder in the languages of the minorities: in Russian, Polish, German, and Moldavian.

Two papers published in Kyiv are reckoned to be the most important organs of the Soviet Ukrainian press, viz. the "Communist" (with a circulation of 305 000) and "Visty" (News) with a circulation of 375 000 which correspond to the Moscow "Pravda" (Truth) and "Izvestija" (News) as far as contents and technique are concerned. We might also mention the Kharkiv "Comsomolets Ukrajiny" (Comsomolets-member of the Soviet youth organisation) and "Robitnycha Gazeta" (Workers' Newspaper), "Proletar" (Proletarian) and the Kyiv papers, the "Proletarska Pravda" (Truth of the Proletariate) and "Bolshevik". The entire circulation of the Soviet Ukrainian press was somewhere between 3¾ and 5 millions and the chief centers of publication were Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Odessa.

In spite of all difficulties the press in West Ukraine continued to thrive as may be seen from the following table:

Land	Number in 1934	1936	
Poland	122	143	
Czechoslovakia	16	23	
Roumania	10	10	
total	148	176	publications

204 About the half of all papers in West Ukraine (88 or 50.58 %) appeared in Lviv, 13 in Uzhhorod, 10 in Kolomea, 10 in Chernivtsi, 9 in Lutsk, 7 in Stanislaviv and 7 in Munkach. The most important Ukr. newspapers, published in 1939 in West Ukraine, are: "Dilo", (Deed), "Novyj Chas" (New Times), "Ukrajinski Visty" (Ukrainian News) in Lviv, "Chas" (Times) in Chernivtsi and "Nova Svoboda" (New Freedom) in Uzhhorod.

The Ukrainian press for emigrants increased considerably (1934 = 76; 1936 = 110). The figures for 1939 were: 17 in the so-called Protectorate, 12 in Poland, 10 in France, 7 in Germany, and 1 each in Leningrad, Moscow, and Saratow, 3 in Jugoslavia, 2 in England, 1 in Austria, 3 in the Far East, 2 in Manchukuo, 24 in USA, 18 in Canada, 4 in Argentine, 4 in Brazi.

Among the most important of these are: 1) "Svoboda" (Freedom) — New Jersey City since 1893. 2) "America" – Philadelphia since 1886. 3) "Ukrajinski Shchodenni Visty" (Ukrainian Daily News) — communist daily New York. 4) "Ukrajinskyj Holos" (Ukrainian Voice) — Winnipeg, Canada. 5) "Kanadyjskyj Farmer" (Canadian Farmer) — Winnipeg, Ukrainian Toiler (Toronto). 6) "Narodnja Gazeta" (Native Paper) — communist, Winnipeg. The circulation of Ukrainian papers outside of Ukraine amounts to about 1 000 000; but the papers are actually read by ten times as many people.

661 was to be administered in accordance with a plan drawn up in
558 Moscow. He was replaced by Volodymyr Zatonsky, who had been one of the foremost advocates of russification.

[665] The axe was used still more widely on the entire Communist Party in Ukraine. Within ten months, Postyshev removed two hundred thirty-seven secretaries of regional party committees, two hundred seventy-nine heads of regional executive committees, and one hundred and fifty-eight heads of regional control commissions. Nearly one thousand prominent Communists were removed, not to speak of lesser members. Since there were little more than 125,000 Communists in Ukraine, it is easy to see that a large proportion of the Party was unceremoniously eliminated. Elimination meant not only demotion but it was practically a death sentence, for those expelled were charged with that most serious crime against the state, bourgeois nationalism or sabotage, and the vast majority were either shot or deported.

[814] Postyshev turned his attention to the Academy of Sciences which had already been purged of its leading members. Here he found some two hundred and fifty more who were removed on charges of Ukrainian chauvinism or sabotage. In their place, he introduced ordinary Communists or Russians with more regard to their reliability and their loyalty to Stalin than to their capability or scholarly qualifications.

191 Postyshev's object was the rerussification of the country, for it
626 had already been commented in Moscow that there were too many of the young Ukrainians who were securing an education only in Ukrainian without knowing the master language of Russian. Skrypnyk had paid no attention to these complaints, for he retorted that in Moscow the young Russians were not learning Ukrainian and he assumed that all the Soviet Republics had the same rights. He was soon to learn differently, for from now on Russian was to be the official language of widest use.

● [204] In every considerable city Postyshev established Russian news-
[871] papers which had almost completely vanished during the period of Ukrainization. He opened Russian schools in the leading cities and he introduced Russian into all the other schools on an equality

1 [1933 -- Analyst]
122

The First Occupation of Western Ukraine

The old newspapers ceased at once to appear[1] but the new occupants started in all of the main cities new Communist newspapers as the *Free Ukraine* in Lviv and the *Soviet Ukraine* in Stanyslaviv. They allowed also a Communist Polish newspaper the *Red Flag* and a similar paper in Yiddish. 728 [204]

The old officials were at first encouraged to return to their posts, whether they were Polish or not but in a very short time they began to disappear and they were replaced by Ukrainian-speaking persons, some from the neighborhood and some from eastern Ukraine. At almost the same time, while preparations were begun for the proposed plebiscite, the authorities quietly picked up and incarcerated most of the old political leaders, especially those of the UNDO, the Ukrainian National Democratic League, the representatives of those parties that had sought a normalization of relations with the Poles. [661]

In the same slow and unobstrusive way the Polish police of the different cities were replaced by a "national militia." This was composed of armed groups of young men who more or less volunteered for the work of maintaining order. The Ukrainian and the Jewish organizations tried to bring these self-appointed groups under control but this proved a difficult task for, in many cases, the new Soviet authorities had encouraged some of the more lawless and tumultuous elements to undertake the work so as to profit themselves by the resultant chaos and to facilitate the calling in of their own people. [625]

This era of anxiety on the part of the population and of extreme moderation on the part of the occupying forces lasted for almost a month, while preparations were being made for the election of representatives of all organizations, factories, and groups to a National Assembly for the consideration of reunion with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Meetings were held everywhere, at which attendance was compulsory, and everywhere there was expressed by selected speakers the gratitude of the people for their liberation from the Polish lords and the imperialistic capitalists. Khrushchov and other high functionaries arrived from Kiev to conduct these elections and to superintend the preparation of the lists of delegates. Yet it was almost at once noted that while there 728 666

[1] [1939, Russian occupation of Poland -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

in working out a complex organization after twenty years of near-exclusion from public administration, as well as to delay in securing the approval of Frank and Hitler. On April 13–15, 1940, however, representatives of Ukrainian groups were able to meet openly in Cracow as a steering committee, and in early June this body was formally recognized by Frank as the Ukrainian Central Committee.[13]

The accomplishment was a considerable one, although on paper the new body was extremely limited in its function which, in accordance with Hitler's injunction, was defined as the improvement of the welfare of the Ukrainian population of the Generalgouvernement. For this purpose, the committee was granted the right to prepare a budget covered in part by allocation of funds from the treasury of the Generalgouvernement and was allowed to direct a network of Aid Committees throughout the Ukrainian ethnographical area. Among the more important formal functions of the organization was the distribution of aid received from philanthropic agencies in the United States and from the International Red Cross.[14] As is usually the case with Ukrainian organizations working under the shadow of arbitrary foreign regimes, however, the formal aspect of its activity was not the most important. Officially, the committee had no control over education, but through its relations with the German authorities it was able to exert great influence on the selection of teachers and the provision of instructional facilities. Through its control of welfare funds, it was able to facilitate the attendance of numerous children at the Ukrainian schools.[15] Thus it rendered an important contribution to the reinvigoration of Ukrainian cultural life throughout the area.

This educational activity was carried on in close connection with the development of a Ukrainian press. The November conference, in addition to laying the groundwork for a central representative body, had founded (also under Dr. Kubiiovych's direction) a large-scale publishing agency which issued a series

[13] *Entsyklopediia Ukrainoznavstvo* (Encyclopedia of Things Ukrainian), eds. Volodymyr Kubiiovych and Zenon Kuzelia (Munich: Naukove Tovarystvo im. Shevchenka, 1949), pp. 580–82.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Interview 9.

[Ukrainian Central Committee in General Government -- Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

of new school texts in Ukrainian, as well as popular editions of Ukrainian works.[16] Still more important, it began the publication of a newspaper which stood head and shoulders above any other Ukrainian publication in the German-dominated areas. *Krakivs'ki Visti* (Cracow News, as it was named after the Germans forbade the use of "Ukrainian" in the title) was one of the few papers which did not become a party organ but consistently served as a forum for a broad variety of Ukrainian viewpoints. Moreover, it was the only paper of this nature which possessed considerable material resources and attracted numerous contributions from writers of real talent. It was subjected to a censorship stricter than that inflicted on Ukrainian papers in Greater Germany (although much less severe than that of the papers later established under German rule farther east); nevertheless, it was able to reflect a considerable range of Ukrainian life and thought. As a result it is an invaluable witness of the events of the war years.

From the standpoint of Ukrainian national interests, the favorable policy of the Germans toward the group's cultural development was particularly valuable in enabling it to regain some of the ground lost under the Polish repression. It would take a lengthy volume to detail the ways in which the Ukrainians were able to improve their situation in this respect during the early war years. A single statistic will suffice, however, to indicate the general nature of the gains made. In the school year 1942–43 there were 4,173 Ukrainian-language schools in the Generalgouvernement,[17] while on the corresponding territory before 1939 there were only 2,510—of which only 457 were exclusively Ukrainian.[18] The most marked advance took place in the Chelm area, where, in the autumn of 1939, a large influx of intellectuals fleeing Soviet rule in eastern Galicia brought a new vigor to the cultural life of the Ukrainian community.[19]

[16] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, January 2, 1942, p. 3.

[17] This refers of course to the enlarged Generalgouvernement, which included eastern Galicia. It is, however, indicative of an extension of the Ukrainian educational system which was if anything even more pronounced in the areas west of the San and the Bug.

[18] P. Isaiïv, article on Ukrainian schools in the Generalgouvernement during the Second World War, *Entsyklopediia Ukraïnoznavstva*, p. 952; Buell, p. 279. The remainder were "mixed" schools which Buell says were given over to Polish teachers.

[19] Iurii (George) Tarkovych, "Zabuti Zemli" (Forgotten Lands), *Krakivs'ki Visti*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

cautious aide, Dr. Baran, however, in his capacity as a director of the largest Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo,* went with the editor of *Novyi Chas,* Zenon Pelens'kyi, to confer with A. T. Chekaniuk, head of the newly installed press affairs office, concerning continuation of Ukrainian journalistic activities.[55] Then the true nature of the Soviet conquest began to reveal itself. Chekaniuk was already installed in the editorial offices of *Dilo* and evidently perfectly acquainted with the views and backgrounds of his petitioners. He showed them a staff of twenty newly arrived Soviet journalists who were already preparing the publication of *Dilo*'s successor, the Communist *Vil'na Ukraïna.* Then he made it perfectly clear to his "guests" that while some use might be found for their talents if they were properly directed, the direction itself was already, and would remain, completely in the hands of the Communists.[56]

Within a week, several leading figures in the Ukrainian community, including Constantine Levits'kyi and the secretary of the representative committee, John Nymchuk, had been arrested. For the time being, however, the actual members of the delegation to Soviet headquarters were spared, and several managed to escape to German-occupied territory.[57] The leaders of the UNDO were also arrested; Dr. Dmytro Levits'kyi, the head of the party and of the Ukrainian delegation in the Polish parliament, was arrested on September 28 and so were his most important colleagues about the same time. The arrested leaders were sent to Moscow—it is said to the infamous Lubianka prison—and with rare exceptions have not been heard of since.[58] The Communists, after getting rid of the principal nationalist politicians, quickly proceeded with their own political organization of Galicia and Volhynia. Even the official Soviet version indicates that a minimum

[55] Chekaniuk, a specialist in political journalism, was editor of the major Kiev newspaper *Komunist,* and in 1940 became a candidate of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine.

[56] The preceding paragraphs are based largely on Stepan Baran's article, "Zustrich z bol'shevykamy" (Encounter with the Bolsheviks), *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2, and April 14, 1942, p. 2, confirmed in all essential aspects by Interviews 41, 78.

[57] Baran, "Zustrich," *Krakivs'ki Visti,* April 12, 1942, p. 2.

[58] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* March 22, 1942, p. 4. In one town at least, participants in the revolutionary struggle for Ukrainian independence also seem to have been singled out for arrest or execution (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* August 3, 1941, p. 4).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

German colony. Molotov countered that it was the last "missing piece" of the Ukraine, though he agreed to limit his demands to the northern, predominantly Ukrainian part and offered to permit the repatriation of the ethnic German minority.[80]

Germany was not ready for a break with the USSR; consequently Rumania was forced to give way. On June 28, her forces evacuated Chernovtsy (Chernivtsi),[81] the Bukovinian capital, and the Red Army took over. The sequence of events was similar to that which had occurred nine months previously in L'vov, but the tempo was quicker. The leading newspaper, *Chas,* was Sovietized and a new Communist organ, *Nova Rada,* founded, though a number of Ukrainian books forbidden under Rumanian rule were authorized.[82] The Ukrainian People's House and other national cultural societies were closed. At the same time, the Soviet press assailed the repressive measures which the Rumanians had taken against Ukrainian cultural life. Soviet writers were indignant at the difficulties experienced by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Chernovtsy, although they denounced the Petliurist elements among them.[83] Numerous leading Ukrainians were not allowed to enjoy their new "intellectual freedom," but were arrested or shot as nationalist "counterrevolutionaries." It is said, however, that the German consul and the commission for evacuating the ethnic Germans succeeded in taking out numerous Ukrainian political leaders and priests of the Orthodox Church.[84] In any case, many thousands of refugees, mostly young people, found their way to Germany, where a large proportion provided an invigorating element for the segment of the OUN which had remained under Mel'nyk.[85]

The subjection of the West Ukraine to Soviet rule brought death or imprisonment to a considerable number of prominent Ukrainians; the entire population was oppressed by a heavy

[80] Ambassador von der Schulenburg in Moscow to Auswärtiges Amt, June 26, 1940, *Nazi-Soviet Relations,* p. 159.

[81] Rumanian Cernăuți; German Chernowitz.

[82] *Nastup,* August 3, 1940, p. 3.

[83] "Besarabiia i pivnichna chastyna Bukovyny" (Bessarabia and the Northern Part of Bukovina), *Komunist,* June 30, 1940, p. 2; S. Zhurakovych and Ie. Patner, "Misto pod Prutom" (City on the Pruth), *Komunist,* July 5, 1940, p. 3.

[84] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* September 7, 1941, p. 3.

[85] See Chapter IV.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

tives coming from the west. Numerous local citizens, mostly young men but including also several administrative officials, joined the Nationalist organization. Support was so strong, in fact, that a new district organization (Kraieva Ekzekutyva) of the Mel'nyk party could be formed, headed by the son of the chief of the *oblast* administration and another local leader.[56] Generally speaking, OUN-M influence was predominant in the civic life of Zhitomir as the summer of 1941 drew to a close.

The first OUN-M organizers appear to have arrived with the Wehrmacht. Foremost among them was Bohdan Konyk, a Galician, who was especially concerned with police organization. At the end of July, with the help of a young Carpatho-Ukrainian journalist, George Tarkovych, whose numerous articles are a major source for this period, he went with German authorization to a nearby camp of Soviet war prisoners and selected volunteers for the police force.[57] Zakhvalins'kyi, an East Ukrainian by origin who had once been a member of the Ukrainian Republican Army but who had lived for many years as a common worker in France, was made commander. He was an adherent of Mel'nyk. As his deputy, a local nonparty man, Kalenda, was chosen, while the commander's adjutant was a Bukovinian member of the Mel'nyk party.[58]

A major task of the police force was to prepare an organization for installation in Kiev, as soon as the capital should fall into German hands. The same purpose was evident in the formation of a newspaper, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo;* this organ was destined for transfer to Kiev as soon as possible. Consequently, the chief propaganda workers of the eastern group of the OUN-M were active in its creation. Among them were John Rohach, a Carpatho-Ukrainian, Iaroslav Chemeryns'kyi, one of the leading émigré writers, and Peter Oliïnyk. Under their direction, a number of able local journalists were recruited, though not all of them were adherents of the Mel'nyk party.[59]

All of these preparations served as a backdrop for the most

[56] Interviews 12, 65; cf. V. Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; *OUN u Viini,* p. 53.
[57] Cf. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; Interview 35.
[58] Druzhynnyk in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 10, 1941, p. 2; Interview 65.
[59] *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3-5; Interviews 3, 65.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

reserved for the capital. A number of OUN-M activities there, without being considered important enough to require drastic action, had contributed to a feeling of irritation on the part of the Himmler henchmen. A famous poetess, Olena Teliha, had created an unauthorized Nationalist literary periodical, *Litvary*. A youth group Sich was considered potentially dangerous. A Ukrainian National Council (Rada) had been formed by the Mel'nyk group to act as a symbol of unity in the East Ukraine and, they hoped, eventually to become the central organ of nationalist activities. The risks involved in such activity, in view of the attitude of the real rulers of Germany, were fully understood by the Wehrmacht officers, one of whom advised the Ukrainians to transform the Council into a more innocuous Aid Committee. When this advice was refused, the Council was formally dissolved (November 17), and went underground.[25] The SP authorities were aware of the organ's continued existence, and while they regarded it as too insignificant for immediate suppression, it increased their distrust of the Nationalists.[26] With this background, one can understand why the first blow fell upon the legal, but extremely Nationalist, *Ukraïns'ke Slovo*. Its large circulation—over fifty thousand[27]—gave it, in the eyes of the police, the potentiality of dangerous influence. Moreover, the editorial staff of this organ, as was previously noted, was composed very largely of West Ukrainians and old émigrés; these elements were regarded as especially dangerous by the SS leadership.

Unfortunately for the Nationalist cause, during their two months' activity in Kiev the newcomers had also lost ground in local opinion. Some of the antipathy which they aroused stemmed from the fact that they were outsiders; even those who had been born in the East Ukraine or, like Kandyba, whose father had been born there, had long been out of touch with the local population. With some justification, because they were better organized, had clearer concepts of what they wanted, and were used to displaying initiative, the OUN group took a leading, oc-

[25] *Ibid.*, p. 68.
[26] PS 3876.
[27] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 15, 1942, p. 5.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

the Germans, and hence able to issue ration cards and provide a small income, was indispensable for most intellectuals.[30]

In view of these circumstances, it is not surprising that the German enemies of the Nationalist movement felt that the time was ripe to destroy its prestige by an attack on its principal organ. On December 12, 1941, the SP force seized *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and arrested all the leading editorial workers, including Rohach, Chemeryns'kyi and Oliïnyk.[31] Kandyba, too, was arrested, but by native police in a city *raion* (ward) controlled by the OUN-M; this circumstance allowed him to escape.[32]

Two days later the newspaper reappeared, as *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* but with a quite different editorial policy. The new editor was Constantine Shtepa, acting rector of the University of Kiev. Of Ukrainian origin, he had been an officer in the tsarist army and, although strongly anti-Soviet, remained a pronounced Russian patriot, desiring the acceptance of the Russian culture and language throughout the Ukraine and the maintenance of governmental ties with Moscow. Consequently, he was a bitter enemy of the Ukrainian nationalist movement.[33] The first issue of his paper contained an article, inspired by the Germans, but acceptable to Shtepa, in which the Nationalists were vigorously attacked for turning what "should have been an informational journal into an organ of their group." The Nationalists, it explained, had refused to heed German warnings that the paper must serve the whole community; consequently Shtepa had taken charge to "popularize" it. What this meant, was clarified by an article on the second page which demanded "work instead of politics."[34]

Under Shtepa's administration, *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* became extremely subservient to the Germans. In part this was due to the extreme severity and alertness of the German censorship; the edi-

[30] Interview 59. Liubchenko himself (Liubchenko, pp. 60 ff.), when the shoe was on the other foot and he was compelled to seek work in Kiev, found this to be the case.

[31] *OUN u Viini,* p. 73.

[32] L. Dniprova in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.

[33] Record of interrogation of an editor in Kiev, early 1943, who was a specialist in ancient history, the author of *Die Völkerwanderung* and *Das römische Recht* (CXLVa 78, in Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine) (hereafter referred to as CXLVa 78). The only person fitting this description is Constantine Shtepa.

[34] These articles are reprinted in *Ukraïns'ka Diiinist',* January 5, 1942, p. 2.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

tor himself was compelled to publish over his own signature articles composed by the German propaganda section, although German records show that he vigorously and courageously criticized Nazi policy in private discussions with German officials.[35]

The nationalists were deeply antagonized by these articles which attacked the foundations of their movement by denying the historical equality of Ukrainian culture with the Russian. Shtepa apparently went far beyond even the Communist newspapers in this respect, reverting to the "Little Russian" tradition which was so abhorrent to all nationalist Ukrainians.[36] However sincere his Russian nationalism may have been, for a man of Ukrainian origin, writing in the Ukrainian language, in the Ukrainian capital, to denounce the Ukrainian nationalist movement could only be regarded in nationalist circles as an act of high treason.

During the late autumn, while the *Einsatzgruppen* were crushing the OUN-M groups, the administration of the Reichskommissariat was being established throughout the "Right Bank" Ukraine, while the area east of the Dnieper remained under Wehrmacht control. According to the plans laid in the Ostministerium, the Reichskommissariat Ukraine was eventually to include all of the pre-1941 Soviet Ukraine except Transnistria, Galicia, and the areas acquired by the USSR from Rumania in 1940. In addition, it was to have its boundary extended roughly due east in a line passing south of Kursk to the Volga, where it was to embrace the Volga German Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.[37] In the northwest the Reichskommissariat was to embrace approximately two tiers of *raions* in the southern part of the pre-1941 Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, including Brest, Pinsk, and the greater part of the railroad connecting these towns with Gomel.[38]

By the end of August, the process of pacifying the western

[35] CXLVa 78.

[36] *Biuleten'* (Bulletin), No. 9–10 of the OUN-B (late 1942), pp. 14–15. This clandestine publication was furnished me by Nicholas Lebed'.

[37] Memorandum, Die neuen Ostgebiete, June 16, 1941, PS 1033 (hereafter referred to as PS 1033); Rosenberg to Alfred Meyer, October 20, 1941, PS 1057 (hereafter referred to as PS 1057).

[38] PS 1057; Memorandum, Die Zivilverwaltung im besetzten Osten, Part II, Reichskommissariat Ukraine, PS 702 (hereafter referred to as PS 702).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

tending to offer more scope to national aspirations than did the Germans. Rejecting all claims of Vlasov to speak for their nations, they demanded in categorical terms, backed up by the threat that otherwise they could not "accept responsibility for the consequences which may result among our compatriots from the Vlasov action," that the Germans make the following concessions:

1. Forbid any claim of General Vlasov to the leadership of our peoples;
2. Recognize the right, to take effect immediately, of our peoples to independent states and to pronounce a definite recognition of our national representative bodies;
3. Organize our national military formations under unified command of their own leaders, subject to the German Wehrmacht in operative matters, for the fight against Bolshevism, and turn over the political leadership within these formations to our national representative bodies.[60]

Whether Rosenberg turned over this document to Hitler is questionable, in view of its uncompromising terms, but it is certain that on the same day it was presented he himself sent a very strong protest to his Führer against Vlasov's committee.[61]

Either because neither faction among the German leadership could secure Hitler's unequivocal approval, or because the most powerful Nazi leaders still desired, at the eleventh hour, to pursue their customary tactic of *divide et impera,* no definite choice was ever made between Vlasov and the Ukrainian leaders. The latter were allowed to continue with their efforts to organize their compatriots. At the same time, Vlasov was free to attract those Ukrainians whom he could prevail upon to join his movement.

The Ukrainian-language press was left under nationalist control. The principal paper for the *Ostarbeiter* and other workers in Germany, *Holos,* remained under the editorship of Bohdan Kravtsiv, a determined nationalist, while a leading East Ukrainian journalist, George Muzichenko, left its staff shortly after he joined the Vlasov information bureau.[62] Two other papers, *Ukraïns'kyi Dobrovolets'* (the journal of the military units) and

[60] *Ibid.*
[61] NO 1815.
[62] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 8, 1944, p. 3. A few weeks earlier the Vlasov group had made a strong effort to secure control of these and other Ukrainian papers in Germany. Cf. NO 3039.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

Za Ukraïnu, were kept in the hands of nationalist editors, who were able to direct oblique attacks on Vlasov.[63]

Nevertheless, it is certain that Vlasov was given some advantages, and secured considerable success, in his efforts to recruit prisoners of war of all Soviet nationalities for his Russian Liberation Army (Rossiskaia Osvoboditelnaia Armiia—ROA). Even according to Ukrainian nationalist sources, only half of the prisoners of Ukrainian origin were fully "nationally conscious," and many could not even speak the Ukrainian language.[64] Moreover, Vlasov was able to secure a number of high-ranking ex-Soviet officers of Ukrainian origin for his staff, including the commander of the first ROA division, General Buniachenko. Altogether, units, in various stages of integration in the ROA, totaled three hundred thousand by January, 1945, and of this number perhaps 35 to 40 percent were of Ukrainian ethnic stock.[65]

Apparently no direct threats or compulsion were used to secure adherence of civilians to the KONR.[66] On the other hand, Ukrainian nationalist sources maintain that the apparent German favor enjoyed by Vlasov was a powerful inducement to the de-

[63] For example, the latter newspaper published the translation of an article from *Das Schwartze Korps* (an SS organ) harshly criticizing Russian émigrés, on January 18, 1945, p. 2.

[64] M. Les', "Chomu ia buv 'Vlasovtsem'?" (Why was I a "Vlasovite"?), *Visti Bratstva kol. Voiakiv 1. UD UNA* (October-November, 1952), p. 3, states that 50 percent of the Ukrainian prisoners were "nationally conscious," 40 percent somewhat so, and 10 percent not at all. A contemporary account (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* October 23, 1941, p. 2) states that many of the letters addressed by Ukrainian prisoners to the newspaper which the Germans had established for them (*Nova Doba*) were in Russian, but notes that they were sent to the Ukrainian rather than the Russian paper, *Klich.* The latter also carried material evidently intended for a Ukrainian audience. Other contemporary accounts of the prisoners differ as to whether they could speak the Ukrainian language. One insists that 80 percent were "nationally conscious," and that the Russian prisoners accepted the fact that the Ukrainians were "separatists" without anger, for while the latter wanted an independent state they had always lived peacefully with the Russians and other minorities in the Ukraine (*Krakivs'ki Visti,* December 5, 1941, p. 2).

[65] Unsigned list of units from the eastern peoples, January, 1945, NO 5800 (hereafter referred to as NO 5800). For the percentage of Ukrainians see Les', p. 3, and MS H, which states that Vlasov told Shandruk that 70 percent of the first ROA division were Ukrainians. If so, this figure must have been reached by including persons with very little Ukrainian nationalist feeling whom the Russian National Socialist leader, Bronislav Kaminskii, recruited in the Lokot' area on the border of the Ukrainian and Russian Soviet Republics, since (according to Thorwald, p. 44) Kaminskii's brigade alone formed more than a third of this division.

[66] Interview 45.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

where oral methods by the same number of agitators reached scores and live theatrical performances reached hundreds.

The principal activity of the propaganda department of a Ukrainian municipal administration under German occupation centered around the local newspaper, for other media such as the radio and motion pictures were under complete German control. It is worth devoting considerable attention to journalistic activity throughout the East Ukraine because of the value such study can have in elucidating the whole problem of the extent of nationalist activity in that area. Newspapers not only reached large numbers, but represented a symbol of authoritative pronouncement to a people accustomed to viewing the statements of the Soviet press as announcements of policy not subject to question.[58]

However much the German authorities may have feared the existence of a Ukrainian press, it was absolutely essential for them to authorize and support it for their own purposes. Under the Wehrmacht administration, especially in the early days, a very nonrestrictive policy was pursued, as was indicated by the ideologically independent nature of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* in Zhitomir and Kiev. General ground rules laid down included prohibition of the term "Ukraine" in the sense of a state, rather than as a territorial expression; insistence on reference to Germany as the "protector" of the Ukraine, rather than as an "ally"; and designation of the Wehrmacht as "saviors" rather than "occupiers."[59] Under army control newspapers sprang up in scores of towns, including all of the important cities of the East Ukraine, although in at least one (Poltava) the establishment of a paper was considerably delayed by the unwillingness of any officer to accept the responsibility of censoring it.[60] One reason for the Wehrmacht's

[58] There is considerably more information available on newspaper activity than on other politically significant aspects of the East Ukraine. Since many of the observers who have written accounts of the war period were themselves journalists, they naturally paid considerable attention to this field of activity. Moreover, the West Ukrainian newspapers published during the same period, which furnish the principal source of material on the East Ukraine, were also especially interested in journalistic enterprises. Consequently, one must guard against the assumption that the real importance of these newspapers was as great as the attention devoted to them indicates. Nevertheless, they were unquestionably very significant as means of transmitting nationalism and reflecting national feeling.

[59] PS 053.

[60] USSR Exhibit 278.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

liberality was a desire to carry propaganda to the numerous deserters who, if they were afraid to submit to German authority, might join the Red partisans. Consequently, papers were fostered in the swamp and wooded regions, even in small towns such as Ovruch, Olevsk, and Shchors. Indeed, the propaganda section of the army itself played a major role in founding newspapers, and even provided for the journalistic staffs in Zhitomir, Kiev, Poltava, and Kharkov the services of a competent and comparatively neutral Galician journalist, Peter Sahaidachnyi.

However, as was previously noted, the OUN-M took a leading role in establishing the papers in Zhitomir and Kiev. Its importance was also considerable in a number of the smaller cities. In Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Krivoi Rog, on the other hand, the initiative was taken by persons who had been journalists under the Soviet regime. In Krivoi Rog, Michael Pronchenko, a writer and poet who had been imprisoned by the Soviet regime, but later worked for the local Communist paper, upon Red army evacuation, took over the Communist press and, with the aid of other young men, began publishing a paper called *Dzvin* (The Bell).[61] In Kharkov, it was a former member of the staff of the defunct *Sotsialistychna Kharkivshchyna* who proposed immediately after the German arrival to start a newspaper under the name of *Novyi Chas* (The New Times).[62] It was some weeks before the paper could actually be started; the name then became *Nova Ukraïna,* and a large number of Mel'nyk adherents were on the staff. The chief editor and a majority of his subordinates, however, were local persons unaffiliated with the OUN. In a number of places Bandera organizers, too, assisted local men to establish papers.

When the Reichskommissariat took over the bulk of the East Ukraine, a quite different policy was pursued; the outspokenly nationalist organs were suppressed, their staffs executed. Even the official policy of the Reichskommissariat, presumably approved by the Ostministerium, provided that all matters concerning newspapers in the native language should be submitted to the Press and Enlightenment Division of the Reichskommissariat.

[61] *Krakivs'ki Visti,* November 15, 1941, p. 3; Interview 7.

[62] Arkadii Liubchenko, *Shchodennyk* (Diary), Vol. I, ed. M. Dmytrenko (Toronto: Novi Dni, 1951), pp. 7–9.

204 ●

PLACES HAVING UKRAINIAN NEWSPAPERS 1941-45

- ● Daily
- ◎ More than once a week
- ● Weekly
- ○ Unknown

p. 230

6; Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

204 626 727 186 Newspapers were to be held to the minimum necessary to satisfy the Ukrainian desire for news, and they were to be founded only where "politically unobjectionable" journalists and adequate censorship machinery were available.[63] Nevertheless, as even this directive indicates, the need for a Ukrainian press could not be questioned. It was absolutely essential to have some means of reaching the population with directives, of quieting rumors, and of playing up the few positive features of the German administration. Since there were very few German personnel who could write Ukrainian, local men had to be turned to, although strong requests for newspapers were frequently refused when the Germans felt the burden of providing censors outweighed possible gains in propaganda or administrative convenience.

204 While important as a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy, the newspaper had certain severe limitations as a vehicle for nationalist ideology. Its frequency and size limited its utility. There were a few dailies, but the vast majority of newspapers appeared much less frequently, as the following figures on East Ukrainian newspapers show:[64]

Papers issued	
daily	5
three times a week	18
twice a week	25
weekly	9
unknown	41
TOTAL	98

Moreover, none exceeded four pages, and a large number could print only one page (being printed on the back of Soviet posters, etc.). This sharp curtailment was due primarily to the extremely severe paper shortage, especially in the south. *Nova Ukraïna* in Kharkov was forced to reduce its printing from fifty thousand to twenty-five thousand daily;[65] the daily *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* had to limit publication to three times a week; one paper in the Taurida *Generalbezirk* had to issue one copy of each number to each commune in the area, rather than to individuals.[66]

[63] PS 702.

[64] Figures compiled from numerous sources. It is very probable that the papers marked "unknown" appeared infrequently.

[65] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 21, 1942, p. 3.

[66] PS 1693.

●204 626 727 If all the limited space available had been at the editor's disposal, it would have sufficed for the expression of a wide range of political comments. Actually, a large part, usually the front page, was taken up with "news," mostly military or concerning the allegedly superior attributes of the Germans.[67] Another large body of material consisted of notices and orders of the German administration. Furthermore, the editors were frequently compelled to write, or to print over their signatures, editorials prepared by the German propaganda officers stressing some point (usually fictitious), such as the joys of the *Ostarbeiter* program or the rapid progress of land distribution, which the authorities desired to have propagandized. There was also a considerable number of articles of a factual nature, designed to "educate" the Ukrainians on some topic such as agricultural technique, in which the Germans thought them to be deficient; these were frequently translated from the German press. A certain number of notices of the activity of Ukrainian agencies—the local administrations, the church, cultural activity—was permitted under close surveillance against political propaganda. A very small number of articles on history, literature, and other cultural topics was allowed.

204 727 626 186 These limitations came close to placing the Ukrainian editor in a strait jacket. It is almost universally recognized by persons who were active in journalism at this time, however, that there were a few points at which the jacket might be stretched enough to justify the effort to use the newspaper as an outlet for nationalist expression. The few literary articles permitted, while deprived of overt political content, could be used to a certain extent to

[67] With the exception of a few issues of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* and *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo* from Kiev, the actual copies of these East Ukrainian papers have uniformly disappeared, so that it is impossible to make an investigation based on direct inspection. Their disappearance is readily explained by the hasty evacuation of the Ukraine by the German forces, the danger of having German organs on one's person in a flight to the West when one might fall into Soviet hands, and above all by the desperate need for paper of any kind for ordinary household uses. As a matter of fact, extensive, but by no means complete sets were gathered by the Institute for the Study of the Ukrainian Liberation Movement in Prague, as well as by certain émigré newspapers. The former collection, however, remained in the Czechoslovak capital after the end of the war and eventually fell into Soviet hands after the Communist coup (Interview 30). As a result, the presentation followed here must be based almost entirely on postwar information, and especially upon the numerous descriptions of East Ukrainian newspapers and reprints of their articles contained in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

stress themes which were basic to the formation of national pride, themes such as the nobility of Ukrainian literature, the separate development of Ukrainian and Russian history, and the value of Ukrainian folkways. Articles ostensibly directed against Communists or Jews could contain oblique thrusts at Moscow and the Russians as well; sometimes such articles did indeed represent extremes of xenophobia. Even the articles giving purely factual accounts of Ukrainian activity were prized by the nationalists, since they brought to the public's attention phases of national life which had been prohibited by the Soviets. The fact that a considerable number of such items could be found for reprinting in the relatively free West Ukrainian and émigré presses (although of course the articles so treated were far from representative) indicates that the censorship barrier was not insuperable, and simple a priori consideration of the difficulty of securing alert and reliable censors for such a large body of publications substantiates this assertion.

While it was therefore true that the newspapers could be used, to a limited extent, for nationalist propaganda, the fact that they were edited by writers known to be nationalists had a certain negative effect on the regard in which the nationalist cause was held by the population, since the newspapers were obviously tools of the Germans. Communist propaganda—and Bandera propaganda after the OUN-B workers were forced from editorial posts—made a great deal of this fact. The most courageous nationalist editors tried to overcome this accusation of serving German interests by occasional sly attacks on the Germans, using the "Aesopian" language which the subjects of the Soviet empire had been forced to learn. Thus one editor, when ordered to write an article glorifying the *Ostarbeiter* program, described in glowing terms the luxurious dining cars on the trains to Germany; few Ukrainians observing the miserable cattle cars actually provided could miss the irony.[68] Not a few editors were willing to pursue such dangerous tactics.

As far as can be detected, the only papers which were controlled by pro-Russian elements (aside from the Russian-language papers) were *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo, Dnipropetrovs'ka Hazeta,*

[68] Interview 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

and possibly one or two of the Ukrainian-language papers in the Donbas. A number of papers in the latter area and a few in the southwest Ukraine were influenced by Bandera agents, although edited by local people, and maintained a semblance of independence from German control. The important papers in Vinnitsa and Proskurov remained under OUN-M editors, who, however, had to exert the utmost care to avoid arrest. Some papers, like a group in the area northwest of Poltava, which were led by a young resident of Mirgorod (Myrhorod), Michael Voskobiinyk, who was the editor of the paper there, did what they could to propagate nationalist sentiment, while others in the same district were completely subservient to the Germans.[69]

It is probably safe to say that the majority of editors would have liked to insert nationalist themes in their papers, and did so in the early days before the repression. The terrible danger to which they were exposed, however, seems to have induced most to go even further than was necessary for safety's sake in eliminating every vestige of independent writing and in slavishly following the German line. This was, as some of them were ready to admit, largely a heritage from the spirit-crushing Soviet regime, for West Ukrainians in similar positions were willing to display more initiative even though exposed to greater risks.[70] It was also very probably due to the fact that the editors lacked any experience in journalism, for many had been teachers or had followed other professions which left them ill-prepared for their new tasks. The suspicion which attached to any who had worked for the Soviet press, and had thus been compelled to write anti-German material, forced journalists with Soviet experience to be especially cautious.[71] Whatever the reasons, on the whole the East Ukrain-

[69] Interview 47.

[70] This was admitted by an East Ukrainian in *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk* in a sharp criticism of the editorial staffs who continued the Soviet tradition of complete subservience to authority in journalism, so that in some cases the Germans themselves had to urge them to be more enterprising (March 22, 1945, p. 1).

[71] One of the causes for the dismissal of Pronchenko from directorship of *Dzvin* was the accusation by his enemies that he had written an article against Hitler in a Soviet paper (MS E); Liubchenko feared that a similar charge would be made against him, and wrote that Shtepa told him outright that persons active in the Soviet press could not be employed on *Nove Ukraïns'ke Slovo*, although this may simply have been an excuse to avoid hiring the nationalist writer (Liubchenko, pp. 26, 64).

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

204 186 727

ians, when deprived of Nationalist support, made a rather poor showing as journalists. With some notable exceptions,[72] they did not measure up to the standards of the West Ukrainians or of old veterans of the Republican period like Nicholas Stasiuk, the editor of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta*. As will be shown, the administrative officials were also generally drawn from the intelligentsia, especially those of the academic or teaching profession, and had not been trained for the roles they assumed. That they nevertheless made a better showing of independence and devotion to national aims may possibly be explained by the fact that the Soviet regime had encouraged an attitude of limited self-assertion in local administrative bodies, so long as no questions of policy were at stake, while newspaper staffs were much more rigidly confined to transmission of Communist Party-inspired material and even more minutely controlled. Many persons of initiative must have felt it was better to take posts in which real service of a nonpolitical nature could be rendered, rather than assume the unattractive function of mouthpiece for a repressive regime. The question of the characteristics of the East Ukrainian intellectual can be considered in a larger context in the next chapter.

[72] Among these were Voskobiinyk, Hrynenko (Zhitomir), and a number of editorial writers in Kharkov, as well as those mentioned earlier as founding newspapers, although their careers were generally limited to a few weeks.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

by nationalist Ukrainians. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of the newspapers in the smaller towns were directed principally at rural readers; the extreme shortage of papers[51] in many areas prevented their being of great influence even when they had some nationalist content. Moreover, the central periodical for farmers, *Ukraïns'kyi Khliborob*, with a weekly printing of seventy thousand, was edited by Eugene Arkypenko, who later joined the Vlasov movement.[52] While this publication was not used against the nationalist cause, it was devoid of positive nationalist material, being confined entirely to technical agricultural articles.

The less-than-lukewarm supporters of the nationalist movements who constituted the bulk of the personnel in positions which provided access to the rural population apparently did not do a great deal to convert the dormant cultural nationality of the peasants into active nationalism. There is no question that the cities inevitably constituted a prime target for nationalist efforts. Probably, in view of the severe limitations imposed by lack of time and nationalist personnel, by Red partisans and German restrictions, the enormous task of overcoming village inertia toward a purely political movement could not have been carried out in any case. Nevertheless, the initial failure of the nationalist groups (at least the OUN and others coming from the west) to grasp the overriding importance of the land question, and the necessity of making this a prime means by which the rural population could be won to the nationalist cause, must certainly be ranked as one of the great lost opportunities of this period. If the nationalists had from the beginning used all their energies to present a positive program of agrarian reform as the heart of their message, they might not have left any tangible organization to withstand renewed Soviet occupation, but they might have left behind a concept of the Ukrainian nationalist movement as a defender of the interests of the peasantry. This, along with the vaguer memories of the Republican era, might have left an enduring imprint on the peasantry.

[51] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[52] *Volyn'*, June 17, 1942, p. 4; Interview 45.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

668* tionalists made a strong effort to extend their influence to the region. A large part of these efforts were concentrated on Kiev and Zhitomir. In Vinnitsa, the largest city of Podolia, on the other hand, the situation developed unfavorably for the nationalists soon after the German arrival. When the Germans captured the city, they were impressed by the activity of the director of the medical institute and his ability to speak German, learned while a student in Germany. Consequently, they appointed him mayor. Of mixed Russian and Ukrainian descent, the new mayor considered himself Ukrainian, but favored the continuance of ties with Russia. His administration contained other pro-Russian elements, while the Vinnitsa *oblasi* administration was headed by an ethnic German said to have had Russophile tendencies. The police, on the other ha..d, and the newspaper were controlled by OUN-M adherents, although both were men of exceeding caution.[5] Vinnitsa played only an indirect role in stimulating Ukrainian nationalism; the unearthing in June, 1943, of enormous mass graves of victims of NKVD executions in 1937–38 and during the retreat of 1941, including, it is said, a number imprisoned for nationalist activities, served to increase the dread felt of the rapidly materializing prospect of Soviet reconquest.

668* If Vinnitsa was the chief anti-nationalist stronghold, Proskurov,
186 a smaller city to the northwest, was the headquarters for the OUN-M in Podolia. There the Mel'nyk group counted the mayor and the police chief (a Carpatho-Ukrainian trained in the
[304] Czechoslovak army) among its members.[6] It also controlled the newspaper, *Ukraïns'kyi Holos,* which had a circulation of thirteen thousand, said to have been more than double that of the Soviet paper which had been published in Proskurov.[7] Farther east, the districts west and southwest of Kiev were under strong nationalist influence. While the OUN-M was establishing its headquarters in Kiev, newspapers and local administrations were being formed in a number of small cities such as Vasilkov, Belaia Tserkov', Tarashcha, Korsun', Smela (Smila), Cherkasy, and Uman'. The formation of the National Rada by the Mel'nyk group made a great

[5] Interview 1.
[6] Interviews 1, 50.
[7] *Nastup,* December 25, 1941, p. 4, citing *Ukraïns'kyi Holos.*

impression on the intellectuals of the smaller towns. OUN-M writers and propagandists appear to have maintained regular contact with them for several months in 1941, and it is apparent that the Kiev *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* served as a model for many of the new editors.[8] Schools were opened under the direction of nationalist educators, Prosvita and theatrical groups were formed, cooperatives linked with *Vukospilka* were active. Apparently, too, the town administrations were largely in Ukrainian hands; the municipal authorities in Uman' issued a sweeping order forbidding the use of the Russian language in any office, school, or enterprise under their jurisdiction.[9]

The influence of the nationalists in the towns penetrated to some degree to the countryside in the area west of the Dnieper. For example, nationalist papers like *Nova Doba*, published in Berdichev, seem to have had a moderately large circulation in the villages. There also seem to have been nationalist influences of a purely local character in some places, aside from those brought in by the nationalist parties. Zvenigorodka, a small town about a hundred miles due south of Kiev had been the home of the Free Cossacks, a nationalist organization of the wealthier peasants during the revolutionary period. The group was revived by some of the villagers under the German occupation, and, together with a mimeographed newspaper, served as a focal point for local nationalism.[10]

The influence of the church, especially in the rural areas, was not entirely on the side of Ukrainian nationalism.[1] The Autonomous clergy under Alexius made an early start in reorganizing religious life in this region. They established a diocese of Vinnitsa and Zhitomir, and during most of the period of occupation were supported by the influential Bishop Damaskin (Maliuti) of Kamenets-Podolsk. Damaskin's diocese included nearly five hundred churches, with a hundred and sixty priests.[11] Apparently most of this large organization, which was overwhelmingly concentrated in the rural districts, had no objection to Damaskin's allegiance to the Russophile church. The Autocephalous Church

[8] Interview 30.
[9] *Nastup*, May 3, 1942, p. 2.
[10] R. Sutor in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 31, 1942, p. 3.
[11] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 15, 1942, p. 2.

[1] [After Germans had occupied this territory--Analyst]

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

to have employed Ukrainian or Slavonic in the services according to their own inclination. Consequently, the divergences of the clergy can be used as a gauge of popular feeling on the "Left" as well as the "Right Bank," but the actual conflicts were muted, as were the strictly political rivalries, by the presence of a respected, moderate central authority.

It is true, however, that conflict was sharper in the area west of Kharkov than in its immediate vicinity. Poltava, the second city of the region under consideration, was one of the most purely Ukrainian of cities of considerable size. Too far east to have been the center for a large Jewish population, the removal of this group and the drastic reduction of the Russian element made it more than ninety percent Ukrainian, according to the city census. The nationalist groups were quick to organize there; largely with the help of OUN-M workers, the paper came under their control in November, 1941, and an East Ukrainian member of the Mel'nyk group, a former officer of the Republican army, became mayor.[23] Cultural life was rapidly renewed, two Ukrainian theaters being opened.[24] On the other hand, church organization was disrupted by quarrels between the priests preferring to introduce Ukrainian into the services and those wishing to retain Slavonic; the latter predominated in the city.[25] The former group, however, with sixty parishes in the countryside, joined the Autocephalous Church, and Ihor of Belaia Tserkov' was appointed their bishop.[26] Theophilus continued, however, to claim their allegiance.

Sometime in 1942, the Ukrainian editorial staff and the mayor were shot by German police; the city passed under the control of a Russian mayor, while the new Ukrainian editor could not assert himself against the tight German control.[27] Even earlier, several other nationalist editors in the area had been shot for evading German restrictions.[28] Some of the newspapers came under the control of nonentities who were fully subservient to the

[23] *OUN u Viini*, p. 76; Interview 42.
[24] D. Myronovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 9, 1942, p. 4.
[25] *Nastup*, April 26, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 12, 1942, p. 3.
[26] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, September 6–7, 1942, p. 2. It is doubtful whether he actually resided in Poltava, however, since he is later again reported as bishop of Belaia Tserkov'.
[27] Interviews 1, 42; *OUN u Viini*, p. 76.
[28] Interview 47.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

German authorities; in a few other places, including the important towns of Lubny and Akhtyrka (Okhtyrka), editors continued their endeavors to stimulate national feeling.[29] Remarkably, the editor in the former town was a Russian who, after his pro-Ukrainian work brought him to the verge of arrest, was able to secure a new post as editor of a Russian-language paper in the Kursk *oblast*.[30] Most active of all this group, however, was the young editor of the Mirgorod paper, Michael Voskobiinyk, who pursued a line independent of the Nationalists yet modeled on the work of the *Nova Ukraïna* group.[31]

In general, nationalism in the "Left Bank" region under German occupation can be said to have been characterized by more influence of locally led and organized ecclesiastical and political bodies than the area to the west of the Dnieper. Moreover, it was marked by somewhat less friction between the Ukrainian and Russian elements and a willingness of some of the latter group to cooperate with the effort for Ukrainian nationalist revival. Probably the basic reason for this difference is the fact that both OUN groups were suppressed in this area before they could become very influential, and the nationalist structure which was built up afterwards was formed of persons who feared the extremist program of the integral nationalists. It may be also that the history of the region, with its lack of comparatively recent memories of oppression by Polish lords and the relative independence with which nationalist life could develop, created an atmosphere of self-confidence which militated against the more violent aspects of nationalist egoism.

To the south of the wooded steppe belt just discussed lies a broad region of more open steppe; in general the agricultural population of the area is considerably less dense than that of the region just described. The open plain with its very rich black soil and somewhat lesser rainfall lends itself to the cultivation of cereal crops which require smaller amounts of manpower, in contrast to the mixed sugar beet, dairy, potato, and grain agri-

[East of the Dnieper -- Analyst]

[29] Interviews 47, 50.
[30] Interview 47.
[31] *Ibid.*

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1985 RD1 Ukraine RD1

"all over the Union." Consequently, the area could be expected to be very lukewarm in its reaction to the nationalist movements. This tendency was reinforced by the great distance of the region from the stimulation center in the West Ukraine—Stalino is nearly one thousand miles from L'vov—and by the lack of strong historical ties with the Ukraine. Two special factors also played a role: the suppression of the Kiev OUN-M group came before a nationalist revival could get under way in the area, and the news frightened the few nationalist Ukrainians away from public life; and the German army authorities who were in charge were reluctant to permit even the formal and linguistic ascendancy permitted Ukrainians elsewhere.[65] Finally, even according to an OUN organizer active in the area, the Ukrainians were inclined from long habit to allow the Russians priority.[66]

As a result, in a large number of cities in the Donbas, including Slaviansk, Artemovsk (Bakhmut), Debal'tsevo, and Snezhnoe, the Russians succeeded in establishing a cultural ascendancy without, however, its taking on much political significance. This ascendancy included, in particular, the publication of Russian-language newspapers, which as a rule were not allowed in the former Ukrainian Soviet Republic.[67] A number of Ukrainian-language papers were also founded, some expressly designed for the rural population. In Stalino, with the help of OUN-B organizers, a nationalist editor was able to transform an originally Russian paper into a Ukrainian organ, while for a time Ukrainian-language papers with nationalist tendencies were published in Voroshilovgrad and Kramatorskaia (Kramators'ka).[68] In Enakievo an administration of Ukrainians was installed with the aid of Italian troops which occupied the town, while Ukrainian officials were also found in other city administrations.[69] All efforts at nationalist organization were hampered by the fact that the area was not conquered until late 1941, and, except for a brief period in 1942, they lay within a short distance of the front. A few OUN-M organizers were active in the area, and a considerable Bandera net-

[65] PS 051.
[66] Interview 66.
[67] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 23, 1942, p. 3.
[68] Interview 66.
[69] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, March 12, 1942, p. 3.

6: Armstrong S-4 (no date) 1955 RD1 Ukraine RD1

work directed by Eugene Stakhiv did what it could to encourage national tendencies among the local Ukrainians.[70]

The city of Mariupol' was an outstanding exception to the conditions prevailing throughout most of the area. While Mariupol' was administratively part of the Donbas, lying in the Stalino *oblast*, it is over fifty miles from the Donets basin itself, on the shore of the Sea of Azov. Like the other cities of the Donbas, however, it had grown enormously, more than tripling in size between the two Soviet censuses. Even after the losses of war, its population numbered 178,358, placing it not far below the largest Ukrainian metropolises.[71] What is remarkable for a city in the Donbas, or indeed in the whole southern area, is that it was under full Ukrainian control. Its well-developed Prosvita society and Ukrainian educational system have already been mentioned. The Orthodox Church is said to have been active and oriented toward Ukrainian nationalism, although here as elsewhere in the far south Protestants and dissident Orthodox sects played an important role.[72] In addition, the mayor was outspokenly nationalist, encouraging the formation of a Ukrainian military force.[73] Probably the guiding spirit in the nationalist development in the city, however, was Nicholas Stasiuk, minister of supply under the Rada in 1918, who had managed to survive the Soviet period by working as a park attendant.[74] He took over the editorship of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* which, although restricted by the paper shortage especially acute in the treeless south, was the second most influential Ukrainian paper on the "Left Bank" (next to *Nova Ukraïna*). While necessarily cautious, its tone was strongly nationalist. Moreover, in addition to Stasiuk, there were a number of nationalist journalists to aid in carrying on the newspaper's work. Stasiuk himself is said not only to have carried on this legal pronationalist activity, but to have assisted the OUN-B underground which made its area base in the city.[75]

[70] Ie. Stakhiv, p. 50; Interview 66.
[71] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, August 27, 1942, p. 2; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 24, 1942, p. 2.
[72] *Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 3, 1942, p. 2.
[73] Cf. Chapter VII.
[74] Interview 66; *Krakivs'ki Visti*, August 7, 1942, p. 2.
[75] Ie. Stakhiv, pp. 52–54; Interview 66. The nationalist tone of *Mariiupil's'ka Hazeta* is apparent from the considerable number of its articles reprinted in the West Ukrainian and émigré press.

lent its other ear to the Polish landowners who described the Ukrainian peasants as fomentors of trouble, aiming at the overthrow of the existing agrarian order, which offered great advantages to the Polish nobility.

As a result of the circular of Valouiev[1] publications in the Ukrainian language almost ceased in Russia. The review *Osnova*, which had been the rallying centre of Ukrainian intellectuals, was closed. As a result there was an almost total eclipse, for several decades and almost until the Revolution, of the Ukrainian journalistic movement in Russia. Nevertheless some periodicals appeared, among which *Ukrainskaia Jizn* (Ukrainian Life), edited in Russian at St. Petersburg by that same Simon Petlioura who later became the chief of the insurrectionary Ukrainian movement against the forces of the Austro-Hungarian occupation, and who was assassinated in Paris in 1926. But now, in the place of a cultural Ukrainianism, there formed, on the other side of the frontier, in Galicia, a political Ukrainian movement which was openly anti-Russian and even aimed at the separation of the Ukraine from the rest of Russia.

Henceforth Galicia played the role of the Ukrainian 'Piedmont.' We know that during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries Galicia had been the real centre of Russian resistance in Poland. But after the armistice of Androussovo which, in giving Kiev to Russia, had nevertheless left the land of Halytch under Polish domination, many things had changed there. At the beginning of the eighteenth century Poland had reached the aim never yet achieved before: the definite union of the Orthodox Church in Galicia with Rome was introduced. The last attempts at resistance of the old Russian brotherhoods, now fallen into decadence, did not suffice to prevent it. The direction of religious affairs passed to the Poles and to Polonized Russians who

[1] i.e. the circular which declared that the Ukrainian language was 'only Russian, corrupted by Polish influence'.—Analyst

563 and were even persecuted as 'infected by nationalism'. For the
423 Ukrainian peasants a land reform was proclaimed at the cost of the
414 big landowners, but simultaneously the organisation of collective farms was started, and this caused serious bitterness among the masses of the people. It should be pointed out that between the Western Ukrainian territories recently occupied by the Soviet Army and the old USSR a strictly guarded police border was preserved, in order to prevent any contact between the population of these territories.

2. The Ukrainians under Rumanian Rule (Bukovina and Bessarabia)

563 In 1918 Rumania occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina. The first had been a Russian province, the second had belonged to Austria. In these provinces there were about 1 million Ukrainians at that time. From the beginning of the Rumanian occupation, for 10 years, the state of siege was maintained. This paralysed the political, economic and cultural organisation of the Ukrainians. From 1922, all Ukrainian schools were transformed into Rumanian. The Rumanian Government did not recognise the Ukrainians as a separate nation but declared that the Ukrainians in Bessarabia and Bukovina were 'Rumanians by origin who had forgotten the Rumanian language'. During the state of siege in Bukovina the Ukrainian books in the public libraries were confiscated; in the Churches the Rumanian language was introduced. The Ukrainian co-operative societies were destroyed by administrative oppressions. The only sign of Ukrainian national life was the Ukrainian press, but against this press the Rumanian authorities placed various obstacles.

[665] In 1927 in Bukovina the Ukrainian National Party was founded. This party won at the elections to the Rumanian Parliament 3 mandates — 2 Deputies and 1 Senator.

●[204] The Rumanian authorities greatly feared the possibilities of the development of the Ukrainian movement, and did not admit in Bessarabia even the Ukrainian press, while the Russian press was allowed.

728 In 1940 Rumania ceded Bukovina and Bessarabia to the USSR.
661 The Ukrainian parts of these countries were united with Soviet Ukraine, the territories populated by Moldavians were added to the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic, founded as far back as 1925 within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine. The Soviet occupation by its terrorism and economic policy (forced collectivisation) soon disappointed the population of Bessarabia and Bukovina.

[1. In W... Ukraine under Soviet rule, Sept. 1939 -- Analyst]

9: Prothero G-4 (no date) 1920 RD1 Ukraine RD1

172 In the primary schools only Russian was taught until recently, but in those kept by the *zemstvos* and Ukrainian societies Ukrainian is now also taught. In the secondary schools, which exist only in the larger towns, French and German instruction is given. In the German colonies there are German local schools (private), mostly primary. In the large towns of the western Ukraine and in the Polish colonies and on the large estates there are Polish private schools, which have been officially recognized since 1905. It is impossible to estimate the number of Ukrainians who went to universities, because many of them went to Russian universities outside the Ukraine or to foreign universities; but they can only have been a small percentage of the total number of literates.

● 204 The majority of the newspapers in the Ukraine were Russian. Each Government and each district had its own *Viedomosti*; and there were many Russian papers in Kiev. There were fewer Polish papers, chiefly in Kiev and the western Ukraine. The Germans had local papers in their colonies. The Ukrainians had, up to 1917, some eighteen newspapers, but some of them were printed abroad. In Kiev there were twelve Ukrainian papers, the most popular of which, *Rada*, was started in 1906; in Mohilev one, in Kharkov one, in Yekaterinoslav one, in Moscow one. One of the earliest Ukrainian papers printed abroad was the *Ruthenische Revue*, subsequently called *Ukrainische Rundschau*, started in 1903 in Vienna. This list does not include the Ukrainian newspapers printed in Eastern Galicia in a slightly different language and character.

(C) Political

171 Political conditions in the Ukraine were very much like those in other parts of the Russian Empire, except for special restrictions aiming at russification, e. g. the refusal to appoint the inhabitants of non-Russian districts to important Government positions. But the russification was not so thorough as in Finland